With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor Sunstein by Fajer, Marc A.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 70 | Issue 1 Article 3
Winter 1994
With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor
Sunstein
Marc A. Fajer
University of Miami School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fajer, Marc A. (1994) "With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor Sunstein," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 70 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol70/iss1/3
With All Deliberate Speed?
A Reply to Professor Sunstein
MARC A. FAJER"
INTRODUCTION
In his article, Homosexuality and the Constitution,' Professor Cass Sunstein
does an admirable job elaborating the strengths and weaknesses of various
legal theories for attaining federal constitutional protection for lesbians and
gay men. To a gay activist, what is most notable about his discussion is his
repeated insistence that the federal courts act cautiously in deciding cases that
raise the theories he discusses.2 In particular, he suggests that "the judicial
role is properly limited in this context, especially because of a need to limit
the clash between public judgments and judicial judgments in so sensitive an
area."' Citing the divisive aftermath of Roe v. Wade4 as an example, he fears
that precipitous judicial action might lead to backlash that would harm the gay
rights movement.'
To the extent that Professor Sunstein' is simply arguing that controversial
cases should be decided upon the narrowest possible ground, his caution is
unobjectionable. But to the extent he is recommending that federal courts
refrain from finding antigay state action unconstitutional because of a concern
for the long-term good of the gay rights movement,6 his analysis is subject
to at least three levels of criticism. At a doctrinal level, courts need not
handle equal protection analysis with the kind of caution appropriate for
nontextual rights such as the right to privacy. At an institutional level, the
lower federal courts are ill-equipped to judge whether society is "ready" for
a particular constitutional result, and probably should not rely on such a
judgment to decide particular cases in any event. Finally, at a personal level,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The Author wishes to thank Michael
Fischl, Steve Schnably, Jonathan Simon, and Alan Swan for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Essay, and Linda Casey and Paul Ranis for helpful research assistance. The title, of course, refers to the
Supreme Court's desegregation order in Brown HI. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,301
(1955). The Court's failure to clarify the meaning of "all deliberate speed," according to one
commentator, "in effect, gave the South ten years of delay" in implementing school desegregation. See
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED 112 (1987).
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1 (1994).
2. See, e.g., id. at 1-2, 26-27.
3. Id. at 1-2.
4.410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 25-26.
6. For example, Sunstein argues that judges presently should not accept the argument that antigay
discrimination is a form of gender discrimination. Id. at 16-20. He fears that such a decision could well
jeopardize important interests: it could galvanize opposition; it could weaken the antidiscrimination
movement itself; it could provoke more hostility and even violence against gay men and lesbians; and
it could well produce vigorous calls for a constitutional amendment to overturn the Court's decision.
Id. Similarly, he fears that a Supreme Court decision providing protection for same-sex marriages might
lead to "a constitutional crisis, ... an intensifying of homophobia, a constitutional amendment
overturning the Court's decision, and much more." Id. at 26. Thus, he clearly suggests that caution by
the courts is in the best long-term interest of lesbians and gay men.
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Professor Sunstein is asking individual litigants to sacrifice individual justice
in the short-term for the possibility that doing so might improve the chances
for justice for all gay people in the long-term. These litigants already risk
status and security merely to pursue their claims 7 and should not be expected
to give up important tangible benefits for an amorphous long-range hope. This
Essay will explore each of these criticisms in turn and conclude by suggesting
that the federal courts should look to Brown v. Board of Education8 in
addition to Roe as a model for deciding controversial constitutional issues.
I. THE NATURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Roe v. Wade, of course, was a substantive due process case. 9 Arguably,
judicial restraint is especially appropriate when dealing with substantive due
process claims because they involve rights not explicitly enumerated in the
Constitution"° and because they effectively may prevent the government from
regulating in a particular area at all." Before placing such broad
unenumerated limits on the powers of government, the Supreme Court often
has been careful to demonstrate that the particular claim is supported by a
strong historical tradition.'
By contrast, the Equal Protection Clause specifically enumerates rights. It
does not preclude regulation in entire substantive areas, but instead limits the
7. These litigants generally become well-known to the public. Yet public acknowledgment of gay
identity often has undesirable consequences in our society ranging from estrangement from family and
friends to loss of employment to violence. See generally Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46
U. Miami L. Rev. 511, 570-607 (1992). For example, two different men who each attempted to obtain
marriage licenses with a male partner subsequently lost state jobs at least in part because of their
lawsuits. See Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 194 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972). Joseph C. Steffan was told that he could not graduate from the Naval
Academy because he had admitted that he was gay. When he sued, the lawyers for the government tried
to force him to answer questions about his sexual experiences before and after he left the Academy,
even though his sexual behavior was not at issue when he left the Academy. The court of appeals ruled
that the questions were irrelevant. See Steffan v. Aspin, 920 F.2d 74, 74-76 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
10. Much of the criticism of the decision in Roe centers around this concern. See, e.g., Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof.
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926-37 (1973). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 194-96 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court must be especially careful when dealing with
unenumerated rights).
11. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7, at 1454 (2d ed. 1988).
12. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486 (1965); id. at 493-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1170-71 (1988) (noting the importance of tradition to substantive due process case
law). The Court also has rejected claims of unenumerated rights where it perceived that the claims were
not grounded in tradition. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2859-60 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Roe
should be overruled because the right to an abortion is not historically grounded).
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government's power to classify within the particular areas it chooses to
regulate. 3 Thus, a court may reasonably see less need to use extreme caution
in expanding the scope of equal protection.
More importantly, as Professor Sunstein has noted in an earlier essay,'4 the
Equal Protection Clause especially protects classes of people who are likely
to be at risk in the political process because they traditionally are disfavored
by the majority. 5 If, in trying to determine the scope of equal protection, a
court defers to the majority or waits for popular approval, it stands the
provision on its head. Equal protection is inherently countermajoritarian; the
comfort level of the majority surely is not an element of the claim.
In his essay, Professor Sunstein applies his cautionary approach to the
current controversy regarding the inclusion of lesbians and gay men in the
armed forces. He argues that we "might... believe" that the military's ban
"should be presumed unconstitutional by Congress and the President, without
also believing that federal courts should strike down the ban except perhaps
in the most egregious cases."' 6 In practice, however, the conjunction of these
beliefs is unhelpful and yields results at odds with the purpose of equal
protection. President Clinton may well believe that both the former and the
present military policies are unconstitutional. Because of a lack of will or of
perceived political power, he also appears to believe that he cannot defy
Congress on this issue. Thus, the military can and will exclude openly gay
people in the short run. If the ban violates the Constitution, what benefit is
derived if the lower federal courts choose not to say so? Any decision
upholding the ban seems likely to solidify it further, may help convince the
public that it is just, and will have some precedential value, even in
"egregious cases." Judicial restraint hardly furthers the protection of the class
of people at risk from the majority in this intensely political process. Yet this
is the very protection that the Equal Protection Clause should afford.
II. DECIDING CASES, NOT CAUSES
Professor Sunstein cites Abraham Lincoln's treatment of the slavery issue
as a positive example of appropriate restraint.' 7 However, Lincoln was an
elected official, unpopular for most of his first term, who was trying to
maintain sufficient political control over the country to manage a civil war.
The astuteness of his political thinking does not necessarily serve as an
appropriate model for the judiciary, whose job, after all, is to decide
13. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
14. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1174.
15. See id.
16. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 5. An additional concern raised by this point is the definition of
"egregious." Sunstein suggests that a case involving status but no sexual conduct would be "arguably"
egregious. Id. at 5 n.14. However, it also is "arguably" egregious to treat differently the private,
consensual, off-duty, sexual activity of gay military personnel. The current policy allows the discharge
of gay (but not non-gay) military personnel for just this conduct. See Chandler Burr, Friendly Fire, CAL.
LAWv., June 1994, at 54, 60, 98.
17. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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INDIANA L4 W JOURNAL
individual cases. Judges cannot and should not try to determine the popularity
of the cause before deciding the case.
Determining when Americans are "ready" for a particular constitutional
decision is complicated at best. 18 Recent polls indicate that a majority of
Americans "accept" the "gay lifestyle"'9 and favor laws protecting lesbians
and gay men from employment discrimination.2" Do these statistics mean
that Americans are ready for constitutional protection for gay people, at least
regarding jobs? Other recent statistics show that a majority of Americans
oppose state recognition of same-sex marriages and adoptions by gay
people.2' How much change would be needed to suggest that constitutional
intervention in these areas would be appropriate?
Even if these questions were easier to answer, courts are not particularly
good institutions to determine the popular will. Unlike Lincoln, who had the
benefit of information services and much unsolicited input, courts depend on
what is placed in front of them. The same limited factfinding ability that
suggests that courts defer to legislatures on complex issues22 also suggests
that courts should not try to determine public opinion before issuing
constitutional opinions.
Even if courts could read trends well, they probably should not try to do so.
The Constitution gave federal judges life tenure precisely to shield them from
the popular will. 23 As Chief Justice Rehnquist recently noted, "The Judicial
Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public opinion, but from
deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular
branches of Government comport with the Constitution."'24 Similarly, federal
judges are not in the business of trying to determine what result is likely to
cause the fewest future political problems for people like the plaintiff. For
example, Bowers v. Hardwick makes clear that the states have a legitimate
18. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2865 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting the difficulty of ascertaining public opinion on controversial
issues).
19. See Brad Knickerbocker, Gay-Rights Advocates Step Up Campaigns, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNIToR,
Aug. 12, 1994, at 3 (reporting on a poll showing that 52% of Americans accept the "gay lifestyle"). I
find the poll data interesting because I have no firm idea what the term "gay lifestyle" really means.
Lesbians and gay men exist in all professions at all levels of society. Harvey Fierstein, Martina
Navratilova, and I all think of ourselves as gay, but our "lifestyles" are quite dissimilar. The question
is particularly curious because antigay advocates often use "gay lifestyle" as a shorthand for loveless,
promiscuous lives. See Fajer, supra note 7, at 537-46. I hope that the data indicate that Americans are
becoming more comfortable with openly gay people.
20. See Kara Swisher, Odd Jobs, WASH. PosT, July 31, 1994, at H7 (reporting on a poll showing
that 75% of Americans support laws protecting gay men and lesbians from discrimination in the
workplace).
21. See id.; Knickerbocker, supra note 19, at 3.
22. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4.
23. See Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes From
History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 667 (1969) (arguing that federal judges should be free from political
pressure).
24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2865 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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interest in preventing at least same-sex sexual activity on grounds of
morality.2" At some point, to get around the morality claim in equal
protection cases, the federal courts will have to decide whether sexual
orientation merits some form of heightened scrutiny and, if it does, whether
morality constitutes an important or compelling (as opposed to merely
legitimate) state interest.26 In fact, Professor Sunstein himself has argued that
the morality rationale has "little or no weight in the context of an equal
protection challenge[.]"2 7 Suppose a particular court believes that the
Constitution requires using heightened scrutiny and agrees with Sunstein that
the morality arguments are insufficient to overcome that level of scrutiny.
Should the judges refrain from deciding the case that way if they believe in
the long run that gay people will be better off if the plaintiff loses? Such
''restraint" is not within the usual understanding of the proper judicial role.
Thus, the desirability of Abraham Lincoln (or any legislator or executive)
adopting Professor Sunstein's advice says little about the proper role of the
courts. The historical success of Lincoln's approach to slavery surely does not
suggest that either Dred Scott v. Sandford8 or Plessy v. Ferguson29 were
correctly decided.
III. THE IMPLICIT SACRIFICE
If courts heed Professor Sunstein's advice to wait for sufficient signals from
the political branches before approving equal protection arguments in gay
rights cases, some litigants will lose cases that they otherwise would win.3"
His position necessarily implies sacrificing individual litigants to benefit the
movement for gay and lesbian rights in the long run. This approach may be
appropriate for gay advocacy organizations, which choose cases to support
with an eye to long-term strategy. Indeed, these organizations sometimes
employ just the kind of strategic thinking the approach suggests.3' It is harsh
advice indeed, however, for those individuals who are willing to bear the not
inconsiderable burden of bringing a test case,32 especially because Professor
Sunstein may be wrong about the long-term effects of his strategy.
Judicial restraint may or may not prevent antigay backlash. The rash of
antigay ballot initiatives proposed in 199433 appears to have arisen in
25. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
26. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 6-7 (noting possible limits on morality as a state interest).
27. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1176.
28. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 26 ("The Supreme Court might... accept the most narrow
arguments, and reject or (better) avoid passing on the more general and intrusive ones.").
31. For example, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund recently announced that it currently
would not pursue gay marriage claims "in states where the prospect for defeat seems great," pending
the outcome of its case in Hawaii. See Lambda's Strategic Perspective on Litigating Our Right to
Marry, LAMBDA UPDATE (Summer 1994), at 15.
32. See cases cited supra note 7.
33. See John Gallagher, Pride and Prejudice, THE ADVOCATE, July 12, 1994, at 32.
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response to the general increased visibility of, and improved climate for, gay
men and lesbians, rather than as an attempt to counter any particular judicial
decision. Indeed, I cannot think of any pro-gay court decision to date that has
sparked significant national discussion. Professor Sunstein specifically
expresses fear that if courts grant rights too quickly to gay men and lesbians,
an angry populace will push for a constitutional amendment to undo their
decisions.34 However, even Roe never created sufficient backlash to incite
Congress to pass any of the amendments proposed to overrule it.35 On the
other hand, clear statements of principle from the judiciary may help
legitimate the idea that gay people should be treated equally. In any event, the
public response to particular cases is likely to be quite fact-specific and hard
to predict.
36
Despite this uncertainty, Sunstein urges the path of restraint as the best road
for gay rights in the long run. Is this really an acceptable answer to the
individual litigants who will lose their cases as a result? Could you
confidently reassure Joe Steffan, whose brilliant tenure at the Naval Academy
was cut short three weeks before graduation by his admission that he was gay,
that his sacrifice would be worthwhile?3 7 What about Colonel Margarethe
Cammermeyer, who was forced to end a distinguished career as a military
nurse? 3 Or Sharon Bottoms, who lost custody of her child due to the judge's
presumption that a lesbian mother is unfit?39 I would need much more
evidence than we presently possess before I would be comfortable telling the
brave individuals whose lives underlie important gay rights cases that in
losing their battles, we are winning the war. These individuals have a right to
have courts consider their cases on the merits without judges including the
popularity of the result as an element of the claim.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that Professor Sunstein's cautious approach to
constitutional adjudication of gay rights issues is inappropriate. The Equal
Protection Clause inherently requires courts to challenge current majoritarian
beliefs. Courts should decide cases without regard to guesses as to how their
decisions will affect the political climate regarding the issues under dispute.
34. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 26.
35. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521 (12th ed. 1991).
36. The polling data cited above support the fact-based nature of people's responses to different gay
issues. See supra notes 19-20.
37. See JOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BOUND: A GAY AMERICAN FIGHTS FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE
His COUNTRY 134-67 (1992).
38. See Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Must Reinstate Nurse Who Declared She is a Lesbian, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1994, at Al.
39. See Elizabeth Kastor, The Battle for the Boy in the Middle; Little Tyler's Mom is a Lesbian, so
Grandma Got to Take Him Away, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1993, at Cl. The decision was reversed by the
Virginia Court of Appeals, but the case still is pending before the Virginia Supreme Court. See
Grandmother Appealing Decision Giving Lesbian Custody of Son, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1994, at 22.
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Litigants have a right to have their claims heard on the merits at the time they
bring them.
Professor Sunstein's caution appears to rest, at least in part, on his
perception that Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe was divisive and harmful
to both the women's rights and the abortion rights movements.40 Yet federal
courts would do well to remember that Roe is not the only example of
controversial constitutional decision-making available as a model. In Brown,
the Supreme Court not only set out a clear statement of principle that was not
yet firmly settled in the collective consciousness, but actively eschewed the
"limited role" that Sunstein envisions for the federal courts in the struggle for
gay rights. 4' Despite the power of that decision, many view the social tasks
undertaken by Brown as incomplete forty years later.42 How much more
incomplete would the task be had the federal courts followed then the advice
Professor Sunstein offers today?
40. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 25-26.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Forty Years and Still Struggling, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1994, at A22; Bob Herbert,
In America: After Brown, What?, N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1994, at A23; see generally BELL, supra note *.
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